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Climate Justice: Contested Discourse and Social Transformation 
Introduction 
Climate justice is often described as a framework which links the policies and technologies of 
tackling climate change with some kind of approach to social justice (human rights, 
redistribution, impact on the poor etc). This paper argues that in order for climate justice to 
have integrity, it must be rooted in the material interests of those social groups negatively 
affected by and engaged in struggles against the hydrocarbon economy. Many such groups do 
not identify with climate justice but have common cause with climate justice action which is 
oriented critically against an economic logic of growth and capital accumulation. 
Climate justice as a concept has a relatively recent history, moving quickly from social 
movements and radical NGOs to policy debates. The Mary Robinson Foundation (no date) has 
taken an authoritative position in seeking to promote a perspective of climate justice which 
links human rights to development, “safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable and sharing 
the burdens and benefits of climate change and its resolution equitably and fairly.” As Bond and 
Dorsey (2010) point out, this interpretation of climate justice, located in a discourse of 
development policy is one of several that are contested and serve different sets of interests. 
Whilst providing an important corrective to narratives about climate change which ignore the 
differential interests of social groups, and thereby providing an approach to climate mitigation 
and adaptation which is somewhat redistributive, development and human rights tends to 
promote versions of climate justice that leave unchallenged entrenched vested interests. 
Rather than seeking an agreed definition of climate justice, this article argues that the diverse, 
potentially contradictory and contested meanings and practices which constitute climate justice 
discourse should provide a source of analysis of the processes of contestation amongst social 
groups necessary for delivering climate justice. Discourses reflect the material interests of social 
groups with differential access to the discourse forming process. Because climate justice 
discourse influences policy, an analysis of such interests will contribute to an understanding of 
which interests are enhanced and which are neglected, and therefore the likely social 
distribution of costs and benefits in the implementation of policy. Virtually all interpretations of 
climate justice seek interventions that protect the poorest and most vulnerable and promote 
greater equality, or at least do not exacerbate inequality. Climate justice discourse therefore 
carries greater moral authority when it embeds the material interests of those groups who are 
currently experiencing the costs of climate change most severely (and also serves to critique the 
material interests of those who are benefiting). This can only occur through the engagement in 
discourse production by such groups who are active in challenging these costs, by articulating 
their collective interests in contestation with the causes of climate change – the hydrocarbon 
industry and its investors,  
Climate justice therefore faces two types of challenge. First, is for climate justice theorists to 
analyse the material interests which are embedded within the discourse. When advocates of 
climate justice ignore these material interests, there is a risk of rendering inconceivable, forms 
of social change which challenge hegemonic groups. Such a discourse therefore serves to 
prevent the implementation of climate justice. 
The second challenge lies in the theoretical and practical barriers involved in building the 
climate justice movement. A conceptual distinction is made between the Climate Justice 
Movement which emerged from global justice protests and has been at the forefront of shifting 
discourse from climate change to climate justice, and the climate justice movement which 
constitutes a broader potential collectivity of communities and social groups engaged in conflict 
with the hydrocarbon industry. This distinction is more heuristic than empirical, but serves the 
purpose of addressing the process of developing climate justice discourse. Although the Climate 
Justice Movement includes many examples of grassroots campaigns and movements of directly 
affected communities who are challenging climate change (for examples see Klein, 2014), there 
remains a disconnect between the Movement and many communities challenging the 
hydrocarbon industry and its owners.  
In some respects this is not new, but is rather a similar challenge of alliance building between 
environmentalist and social justice movements which has been addressed both theoretically 
and practically for over fifty years (in, for example the Red-Green and ecosocialist literature 
(Bahro, 1982; Weston, 1986; Gorz, 1987; Pepper, 1993; O’Connor, 1998; Capital & Class, 2000)). 
However, in climate justice, the barrier is not just between different types of movement fighting 
disparate symptoms of a common cause, but additionally faces the problem that climate change 
constitutes the symptoms of the uncontrolled waste stream of an exploitative hydrocarbon 
industry which is being resisted throughout its economy. Many movements do not experience 
‘climate change’ directly, but its impacts or else the exploitation processes elsewhere in the 
political ecology of the industrial process. In which case addressing this challenge requires an 
understanding of social movement processes and the collective learning which occurs within 
them.  
 
  
As narratives of climate justice find their way into policy discourse, the question of whose 
interests are served and whose damaged attains greater significance. In Scotland, climate justice 
policy is framed in terms of the relationship between North and South and the histories of 
colonialism of and solidarity with the people of the South. The Scottish Government’s Climate 
Justice Fund provides seed funds for development projects in the South (primarily in Malawi, 
with which Scotland has a strong historical relationship), using public funds to leverage private 
capital investments into development projects that promote adaptation and resilience to 
climate change. At the launch of the Fund, the Scottish Government came under criticism from 
some who were otherwise supporting the initiative, for failing to meet its own ambitious targets 
for carbon dioxide emission reductions and continuing to support the fossil fuel industry at 
home. Moreover, the framing of climate justice as an exclusively North-South issue was 
politically useful for the secessionist Scottish National Party (SNP) government, serving to 
demonstrate its capacity to intervene progressively in foreign affairs over which it has no 
formal responsibility, rather than focusing on the domestic policies that it does. This also 
provided distance between the SNP and the former Labour-led government which adopted 
official policy on environmental justice (Scandrett, 2010). 
The debates about the meaning of climate justice are similar to those concerning environmental 
justice, although whereas climate justice originates in the narratives of the global justice 
movement, environmental justice emerged in the context of the local environmental struggles of 
directly oppressed groups. In the USA, where environmental justice achieved resonance 
amongst a range of actors from social movements through to policy makers, its origins – and 
also its moral integrity - lay in African American struggles against racism (Bullard, 1990). This 
facilitated the adoption of an environmental justice discourse by other groups that could 
identify with that struggle, and provided the legitimacy to include within the environmental 
justice movement groups not directly identifying with an environmental justice discourse 
(Faber and McCarthy, 2002). It is argued here that, for a discourse of climate justice to achieve 
this same moral integrity it needs to be rooted in the popular struggles of oppressed groups 
who share an experience of exploitation by the hydrocarbon industry. 
Discourses have an ideological function. They serve the interests of social groups differently and 
are the result of the combination of contributions to the discourse from these groups.  As 
Raymond Williams (1973) demonstrated, a ‘corporate’ culture derives from the diverse 
contributions of symbols, meanings and practices of its component social groups, each reflecting 
their own collective interests. These groups emerge and decline in influence, and their cultural 
contribution is incorporated or obstructed, in a constant dynamic process of contestation. 
Aspects of the corporate culture become hegemonic because they reflect the interests of a 
sufficiently powerful alliance of social groups. This is a complex process of contestation of 
meanings, but what is crucial about this analysis is that whilst discursive negotiations occur in 
the domain of ideas and concepts, they nonetheless retain a reflection of the material interests 
of the social groups from which they have emerged. Thus, what appears to be ‘possible’ becomes 
what is compatible with the interests of groups with sufficient influence in the complex of 
discourses, and options for change which challenge these interests become ‘inconceivable’.   
Leslie Sklair (2001) analysed the contestation for hegemonic meaning in the discourse of 
sustainable development demonstrating the shift in class interests reflected in the meaning of 
sustainable development as the business community attained greater influence. In the USA in 
the 1980s, the environmental justice movement not only challenged the racially unequal 
distribution of environmental costs, but also sought to challenge the meaning of ‘environment’ 
and the practices of environmentalism. Contrary to the dominant environmental discourse of 
white, educated, middle class environmentalists, the environmental justice movement insisted 
that the collective experience of African Americans and other racialised groups in the USA be 
incorporated into an understanding of the environment (Schlosberg, 2002).  
The diversity of narratives of climate change and the interests that they reflect has been well 
documented (Bȁckstrand and Lövbrand, 2007; Urry, 2011; Scandrett, et al. 2012; Ytterstad, 
2014). Despite the complexities of contestation, discourses of climate change can broadly be 
allocated to categories of neoliberal, ecological modernising or transformational, which 
correspond to the dominance of transnational capital, the professional-managerial class and 
exploited groups respectively. None is completely hegemonic, and struggles for hegemony 
reflect the interests of groups with differing material interests. The struggle for hegemony 
within a discourse serves to ensure that emergent practices and policies protect or enhance the 
interests of hegemonic groups. In other words, in the contestation of meaning in climate change 
narratives, it is important to ask whose interests are being served in the policies and practices 
that result, and whose interests are being neglected. 
This social process is seldom explicit and mostly un-noticed, but rather serves to manufacture 
‘common sense’ within which the interests of certain groups are taken for granted. Thus, a 
neoliberal discourse on climate change can only countenance policy options that protect or 
enhance the interests of the capitalist class – those who profit from business growth; a 
modernisation discourse presumes the interests of the technical and managerial class who 
operationalise it; and a transformational discourse is based on the interests of those currently 
excluded or exploited in the current system, who have the most to gain from changing it.  
Some scholars have sought authoritative justification of environmental and climate justice 
through claims to social justice in political philosophy (Dobson, 1998; Schlosberg, 2009). 
However this is unlikely to resolve contested meanings since such justice claims are themselves 
contested, and arguments for justice can justify neoliberal (Nozick, 2013; Saunders, 1995), 
ecological modernising (Beck et al.,1994; Rawls, 2009) and transformational (Fraser, 1997; 
Harvey, 1996) approaches. Rather, it is through understanding the socially produced meanings 
in discourses that makes it possible to discern amongst claims to climate justice, to enhance the 
interests of those most dispossessed by climate change and the industry that produces it. 
Analysing this contestation is to seek to make explicit the interests that are embedded within 
the discourses of climate justice and therefore can find their way into policy, so that what is 
largely invisible is made a little clearer. In other words, discussions about climate justice are not 
just about technologies, policies or meanings, but also about material interests that are 
embedded in these. It is no accident that climate change policies disproportionately benefit the 
richest and negatively impact on the poorest (Preston et al., 2014) it is a reflection of the 
balance of interests that were able to influence the policy discourse. A narrative of climate 
justice which has integrity must be rooted in the interests of the oppressed through their 
struggles for justice. 
One problem with this claim is the disconnect between climate change and the experiences of 
those who do not experience ‘climate injustice’ but rather flooding, drought, storms, crop 
failure, disease etc. Moreover, climate change describes the impact of the waste stream arising 
from a hydrocarbon economic cycle, whereas most of the directly affected communities, and 
therefore the local struggles, are facing other stages in the same hydrocarbon economy that are 
not directly connected with the waste stream. For environmentalists there is an obvious 
connection between climate change and very many local community campaigns against oil 
pipelines, refineries, power stations, land grabs, oil palm development, opencast coal mining, 
gas flaring, fracking, methane extraction, incineration etc. but this is not necessarily obvious, or 
even tactically valuable to the communities trying to protect their local environments. Whilst 
the roots of environmental justice in the citizen-based anti-toxics struggles allows for a 
recognition of such struggles in the environmental justice movement, that becomes more 
difficult for climate justice struggles.  
The Climate Justice Movement emerged from the global justice movement which is identified 
with the ‘battle of Seattle’ and other protests at international summits of the WTO or G8 etc 
(Flesher Fominaya, 2014); participation in the World Social Forum (Sen et al, 2004); or globally 
connected local actions such as Occupy. The Climate Justice Movement formed in 2007 around 
the UN Conference of Parties (CoP) 13 in Bali. It demonstrated its strength in opposition to CoP 
15 in 2009 in Copenhagen, and organised in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2010 in the World People’s 
Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth. It has continued to organise, for 
example in Margarita, Venezuela in 2014, to mobilise protests at Conferences of Parties to the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and remains central to any discussion of climate 
justice (Bond and Dorsey, 2010). 
This ’organised’ Climate Justice Movement, which has mobilised protests and alternative 
narratives at international conferences, comprises a wide range of actors, from direct action 
environmentalists, to indigenous peoples, to directly affected communities, grassroots social 
movements such as La Via Campesina and radical NGOs such as Friends of the Earth 
International and Third World Network. However, there remain problems of cultural 
negotiation between this Movement, and the local community struggles within the broader 
climate justice movement, with their own traditions of dissent. Bond and Dorsey (2010) provide 
an optimistic analysis of coalitions forming within this broader climate justice movement and 
include a number of local community-based struggles against coal mining, power stations, 
incinerators, oil extraction and even large scale hydro-electric dams. The extent to which these 
diverse struggles, largely in the USA, identify themselves as part of the climate justice movement 
is not explained. This process of alliance building is far from simple and not always as optimistic 
as Bond and Dorsey seem to suggest, and this demands an analysis of how climate justice 
narratives can develop which are rooted in the material interests of those oppressed by the 
hydrocarbon industry. 
In order to analyse the opportunities and difficulties in constructing such climate justice 
narratives, it is necessary to draw on ‘movement-relevant theory’ (Bevington and Dixon, 2005) 
generated by activists and scholars engaged in struggles against hydrocarbon industry, 
including campaign materials and activist testimony as well as academic literature. 
Participatory Action Research, often conducted by activists, sometimes through activist-
orientated educational programmes and published in blogs, reports to NGOs and student 
dissertations etc, is an important source of analysis of the cultural dynamics in the construction 
of climate justice discourse. 
Scandrett et al. (2013) refer to a number of examples of such discursive negotiations over 
climate change. A campaign against the extension of Mainshill opencast coal mine in South 
Lanarkshire attracted local resistance from a working class community whose traditions of 
dissent – the trades unions and the Labour Party - had been largely abandoned since the defeat 
of the National Union of Miners in 1985. The conflict over the opencast mine also attracted 
direct action activists who established a Camp for Climate Action at the mine in order to attempt 
to sabotage the mine development. There had been a long process of relationship building 
between the activists at the climate camp and the local working class community. In a pamphlet 
on the campaign, an activist from the climate camp writes. 
“In the summer, during The Camp for Climate Action at Mainshill some people snuck out 
in the night and dismantled the conveyor belt at Glentaggart opencast mine. This was 
the first pixie action to be reported since the camp had arrived and it provoked an 
interesting and difficult discussion between campers and the local anti-opencast 
campaigners. At the camp we were excited by the news of the action and generally 
pleased that it had happened. But, in a large meeting at the camp some of the locals told 
us that they were unhappy with this kind of action—that it increased the amount of 
lorries transporting coal by road in the area, that we’d crossed a line and that if it 
happened again we wouldn’t be seeing them at the camp any more. 
“We’d pissed off the very people that we were there to support and it didn’t feel good. 
This was a hard blow to our enthusiasm to push our limits and step-up our tactics to 
take the fight direct to those waging destruction.” 
As Scandrett et al. (2013) note: “This conflict is between two cultures of resistance. The 
traditions, codes of conduct, and nomenclature of the DA [direct action] environmentalists have 
grown through praxis and debate during actions and camps, on campuses and in squats, online 
and in the samizdat publications of the movement. This is a culture outside that of conventional 
working-class community action, which has its own traditions of collective accountability, an 
intimate knowledge of the local area and workings of opencast mines and a critical respect for 
legal and state processes from which they had more to lose in the long term.” (p. 301) 
Conflicts over cultures of resistance to the hydrocarbon economy also emerge in the 
relationship between directly affected communities and their NGO allies. In recent, currently 
unpublished research, the author has gathered data on these conflicting narratives where, in the 
struggle against coal bed methane extraction in Scotland, communities explicitly reject a 
climate-related narrative as detrimental to their interests because it presumes an a priori 
opposition to the development, irrespective of the impacts on local public health and economic 
opportunity. The realities of using Development Planning and environmental licensing 
regulations and of political lobbying ironically encourage a narrow focus on immediate impacts 
of the technology and a dismissal of concerns about the climate, and this disconnect is 
encouraged by developers and their state backers who seek to divide their opposition.  
Ó’Donnabháin (2014) analysed a conflict between UK based Earth First! direct action 
environmental activists and the community of Rossport, Co Mayo, Ireland, the site of a 
longstanding and acrimonious struggle against the development by Shell of a pipeline to 
transport gas from offshore extraction for land-based refining. The Irish state has contributed 
considerable resources to support Shell whilst the local community has received support from 
aspects of the ‘institutional left’ in Ireland, largely associated with the Republican movement, 
and from direct action environmentalists, including many from Britain affiliated to Earth First!. 
The community and its supporters from the left in the Irish urban centres formed an alliance 
‘Shell to Sea’. The direct action environmentalists were encouraged to be part of the campaign 
although the ignorance of many of the British activists of the long history of Irish anti-colonial 
struggle against Britain led to difficult internal conflicts. Material interests from the legacy of 
colonialism were obscured in the contested construction of discourse. 
In his analysis of extracts from pamphlets published by the Earth First!ers, Ó’Donnabháin 
(2014) highlighted the difficulties in constructing a climate justice discourse through a dialogue 
between these groups of activist. For the Earth First! activists “… Rossport is the line in the sand.  
It’s the front line in the battle against climate change” (p.28) whilst for the community a more 
compromised cost-benefit analysis could be countenanced, influenced by their Irish Republican 
allies. Another Earth First!er writes: “If I’m honest, under pretty much any other circumstances 
there is no way that I would be actively supporting people who were essentially campaigning 
for a multinational company to extract and process gas, as long as it happens at sea, and a 
greater proportion of the profits go to the state.” (p.38). 
If climate justice is to achieve the integrity of being rooted in the material interests of social 
groups oppressed by the hydrocarbon economy, how are these challenges to be addressed? 
Raymond Williams (1989) used the term ‘militant particularism’ to describe the forms of 
resistance which particular groups develop to address their own experiences of oppression and 
which can both empower and set limits to action. Nilsen and Cox (2013) locate militant 
particularism within what they call a ‘social movement process’ in which the dialectic between 
empowerment and limitation generates a collective learning process which deepens political 
analysis and addresses common causes of diverse struggles.  
The experience of a respondent in one of the communities challenging coal bed methane 
extraction in Scotland describes this process. 
“I started off this process believing they [the company] should be an integral part of it. 
That fits with my [philosophy:] there can be no learning if there is no communication 
and there can be no resolution if there’s no communication. But they just lie, and so 
that’s where it’s broken down. You can’t talk to somebody if they don’t tell the truth. 
And really the experience with [the company] was them coming to a meeting and 
then saying something and then the community doing their good research and 
finding that it’s not true. And you know there’s only so many times that that can 
happen and you say, ‘you know I don’t believe a word that you’re saying’… 
…Then after the appeal, [the company] suddenly went on the offensive … they went 
from [it] being a relatively civil discussion to being quite aggressive … And that followed 
through the whole process … In that situation you are up against someone who is a bully 
and a liar. So it’s very, very difficult to talk to somebody in that situation… 
… I’ve got quite a thick skin but there are times when it was quite hurtful at the public 
inquiry. They’ll do anything – they don’t care. … I’m an ‘externality’, the community’s an 
‘externality.’ You can’t talk with somebody if you’re not a human being to them – and 
that goes for all of them… 
… after a couple of weeks I went: ‘what is the root of this?’ …  and I realised that actually 
the legal system is fucked – deep down I’ve always known that ‘might is right’  but what I 
realised after this process is that it is incredibly - you know this conspiracy theory - this 
is a system that has evolved over time to look like it’s doing a job fairly and in fact it’s 
designed to maintain a particular structure. So the penny dropped that the law is an ass. 
It can only be stopped by another way, but I had to go through all of that process.” 
(unpublished interview transcription 2015) 
For Nilsen and Cox (2013), the realisation of the inherent corruption of profit making/cost 
shifting and the collusion of the legal system – and therefore the limits of struggle within a state-
economic framework which defends the interests of powerful groups - may be regarded as a 
step in the social movement process that generates alliances and alternative hegemony. As 
Nilsen (2010) puts it “social movements from below [are] immanent forces that emerge on the 
basis of needs and capacities that are simultaneously spawned within and frustrated by a given 
historical totality – sometimes through submerging everyday struggles, sometimes through 
making claims on the state within the parameters of an institutionalised social formation, and at 
other times again through challenging the basal relations of power upon which a social 
dimension is based” (p. 201). 
However, Nilsen and Cox (2013) also remind us that social movement processes are not linear 
or teleological, but dialectical. At the same time as the social movement process ‘from below’ is 
challenging hegemony through praxis, social movements ‘from above’ also actively engage in 
discourse generation and negotiation in order to defend and extend their own interests.  
Climate justice emerged as a challenge to a climate change discourse which increasingly became 
restricted by the demands of compatibility with corporate interests with the result that policies 
incompatible with these interests became inconceivable. This led to disastrous policies such as 
carbon trading, carbon futures, joint development mechanisms and REDD, which reproduced 
injustices with limited impact on climate change. The climate justice discourse is now subject to 
similar contestation between interests. One of the ways in which hegemonic groups are 
protected is through the obfuscation of interests embedded in discourses, such that ruling 
interests have the appearance of having universal benefit. The engagement of groups fighting 
exploitation by the hydrocarbon industry contributes to the exposure of these hegemonic 
interests. 
  
Conclusion 
It has been argued that an explicit analysis of interests embedded in climate justice discourse, 
and incorporating the struggles of groups exploited by the hydrocarbon industry, provides the 
discourse with moral authority, and contributes to climate policy which is more socially just. 
However, a discourse with moral authority is inadequate. Incorporating the interests of 
exploited groups into policy can be understood as part of a social movement process in which 
the climate justice movement makes claims on the state “within the parameters of an 
institutionalised social formation”. However, as Nilsen (2010) argues that the same movements 
can, “at other times [challenge] the basal relations of power upon which a social dimension is 
based” (p. 201). 
The Climate Justice Movement clearly expresses a coherent critique of political economy that 
integrates a range of anti-capitalist analyses with the axioms of indigenous peoples. The report 
of the Structural Causes Working Group (2010) at the Cochabamba conference diagnoses: 
“… capitalist logic places financial gain over people. … profit and profitability are placed 
above everything else and the rights to access and the efficiency of basic services for the 
people are converted into commerce…. Today, “climate change” has become a business 
for the capitalist system.  
Capitalism as a patriarchal system of endless growth is incompatible with life on this 
finite planet. For the planet, every alternative for life must necessarily be anticapitalist … 
The alternatives must lead to a profound transformation of civilization. Without this 
profound transformation, it will not be possible to continue life on planet Earth.”  
The ongoing work of exposing the interests embedded in the discourse of climate justice, 
engaging the groups exploited by the hydrocarbon industry and the praxis of building 
anticapitalist alternatives are all part of a social movement process which contributes to such a 
transformation. Harvey (1996) describes discourse as a ‘moment’ which, in the context of 
dialectical interaction with others (social relations, material practices, power relations, 
institution building etc) contributes to ‘the locus of change’. In a later elaboration (Harvey, 
2010) based on Marx’s analysis of the transformation to capitalism he argues that “Social 
change arises through the dialectical unfolding of relations between seven moments within the 
body politic of capitalism viewed as an ensemble or assemblage of activities and practices”. For 
scholars engaged in the discourse of climate justice, a reflexive consideration of the material 
interest embedded in climate justice - and therefore ideological function – is an important 
component of contributing to such a transformation, as is the pedagogical and dialogical work of 
engagement with the militant particularism of local struggles against the hydrocarbon industry. 
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